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Introduction
We consider the estimation problem for a class of dynamic games of incomplete information that generalizes the single agent discrete Markov decision models surveyed in Rust (1994) ; for a recent survey see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) . The setup is in an in…nite time horizon, where players' private values enter the payo¤ function additively and are independent across players, under the conditional independence framework. A Markov equilibrium of such game can be represented by a …xed point of nonlinear equations in the space of choice probabilities and has been shown to exist (e.g. see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) ). A variety of methods have been proposed by di¤erent authors to estimate the same class of games based on the equilibrium condition in recent years; examples are given below. However, a common component of these methodologies is a nonlinear optimization problem that may act as a considerable deterrent for applied researchers to estimate dynamic games due to involved programming needs and/or long computational time.
In this paper we propose a class of asymptotic least squares estimators constructed based on the equilibrium condition of the game when represented in the space of payo¤s. Our work is motivated by the well-received methodology developed in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) , who propose an e¢ cient estimator for a unifying class of estimators that includes the non-iterative pseudo-likelihood estimator of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and the moment based estimators discussed in Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) as special cases. In contrast to our work, Pesendorfer and SchmidtDengler use the choice probability representation of the equilibrium to construct their estimator.
Our goal is to show there is much to gain computationally using our approach with no e¢ ciency lost.
Henceforth we use the abbreviation ALSE P SD when referring to a generic estimator of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler.
We claim our estimator can be substantially easier to compute than ALSE P SD . In the leading case our estimator has a familiar OLS/GLS closed-form expression when the per-period payo¤ function takes a linear-in-parameter speci…cation. 1 In an intermediate case when the payo¤ function has an additive partially linear form, Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem can be applied so the parameters in the nonlinear part can be estimated …rst (dimensional reduction), and the linear-in-parameter component 1 The linear payo¤s structure may seem restrictive, but it is in fact quite general as it includes any nonlinear (basis) functions of observables; albeit perhaps with an atheoretic ‡avor. However, linear speci…cation arises naturally in many applications, and/or does not cause much concern in terms of structural interpretability in other situations.
A leading example for the latter is when the goal of an empirical analysis is to study market outcomes, such as competition study of market power. Some notable recent empirical applications of linear-in-parameter payo¤s include Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) , Ryan (2012) and Collard-Wexler (2013) .
can be obtained in closed-form in the second step. 2 Even in a more general nonlinear case, we argue that our estimator is still generally easier to compute than ALSE P SD . ALSE P SD also provides a good benchmark for a comparison with other estimators in the literature as it has a well-de…ned e¢ ciency property. We establish a duality between our estimator and ALSE P SD , in the sense that they can always be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution. Therefore our e¢ cient estimator is as e¢ cient as the e¢ cient ALSE P SD .
The large sample properties of our estimator (and for asymptotic least squares generally) are easy to derive for discrete games. Technically, our estimation problem is a least squares problem with generated regressors and regressands, which are generally smooth functions of the …nite dimensional …rst stage parameters that are nonparametrically identi…ed. In addition, the number of square terms in the objective function does not grow with sample size but is determined by the cardinality of the action and state spaces. Therefore our estimator belongs to the class of asymptotic least squares estimators as de…ned in Gourieroux and Monfort (1985,1995) in the same sense as ALSE P SD . The close connection between our estimator and ALSE P SD goes even further given the smooth bijective relation between normalized expected payo¤s and choice probabilities (Hotz and Miller (1993) 's inversion); ALSE P SD is de…ned to minimize the distance between the probabilities implied by the pseudo-model and the data. We show that, locally around the true, using the inverse function theorem, our estimator can be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution as any ALSE P SD by choosing an appropriate weighting matrix and vice versa.
There are at least two reasons why the estimation of dynamic games can be non-trivial. First, as well-known from the single-agent problem, it involves value functions that generally do not have closed-form and need to be numerically evaluated so it is computationally demanding (see Rust (1996) ). For games, there is also a potential issue of indeterminacy of multiple equilibria that gives rise to incomplete models (Tamer (2003) ). A novel approach popularized by Hotz and Miller (1993) performs inference on the pseudo-model, generated from to the observed data, by estimating the (policy) value functions that can signi…cantly simplify the computational aspect. Pseudo-models are also generally easier to handle in a strategic environment as they have been shown to be complete for several classes of games (Srisuma (2013b) ). Methodologies based on pseudo-models are often referred to as two-step estimators since they require estimation of value functions in the …rst stage.
Many recently proposed estimators for dynamic games are two-step estimators.
However, despite the simpli…cation of two-step methods, the numerical aspects for implementing existing estimators in the literature appear to remain a concern as they generally involve solving highly nonlinear optimization problems. It is not uncommon to see methodology papers using esti- The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with an illustrative example that motivates our estimator, and then describes the model and our estimator for games. Section 3
gives the main results. Section 4 presents results from Monte Carlo experiments that compare the statistical performance and relative speed of our estimator and ALSE P SD . Section 5 concludes and provides a brief discussion on how our estimators can be adapted or applied to complement other recent results in the literature. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Methodology
We begin with an illustration that highlights the idea behind computational advantages of our estimation approach. Section 2.2 describes elements of the game. We de…ne the pseudo-model in Section 2.3 and introduce our estimator in Section 2.4.
Least Squares in Probabilities vs Payo¤s
Consider a model generated by the following binary choice variable:
where x t and " t are independent. Let the cdf of " t be denoted by Q. For all x, let P (x) = Pr [a t ( ) = 1jx t = x], so that P (x) = Q (v (x)). Assume the support of x t is …nite, say fx j g J j=1 for some J < 1, so that we can de…ne P = (v ), where P = (P (x 1 ) ; : : :
Suppose: we observe a random sample of fa t ; x t g where a t = a t ( 0 ) for some 0 2 , which is the parameter value of interest; v is nonparametrically identi…ed up to , and there exists a consistent estimator of v , say b v , for all ; and, Q is known and invertible. Let P = (P (x 1 ) ; : : : ; P x J ) > be a vector of choice probabilities identi…ed from the data, so that P = P 0 , then one may consider a class of estimators de…ned by
where e P and b P are estimators for P and P respectively, and V be some positive de…nite matrix.
Note that e P and b P 0 are generally di¤erent since the former is model-free while the latter is estimated 3 An earlier version of Bajari et al. (2009) , Bajari and Hong (2006) , proposes a two-step estimator that can be seen as the dynamic game version of Hotz et al. (1994) . 4 Another notable estimator that does not take a two-step approach is Egesdal, Lai and Su (2012 
where e v is 1 ( e P) and W is a positive de…nite matrix. As described previously, e v and b v 0 will also generally di¤er.
Equations (1) and (2) provide two di¤erent estimators for 0 . We argue the latter should generally be easier to compute than the former since it is more convenient to compute (e v; b v ) relative ( e P; b P )
across di¤erent values of . This argument is most transparent when v has a linear-in-parameter (2) is unique and has a closed-form, b
Even without the linear parameterization of v , every evaluation of b P requires the mapping of v (x j ) by Q for all j,
for every , where Q is generally a nonlinear function that may have to be computed numerically.
In contrast, for (2), the potentially costly step of applying Q 1 has to be performed only once to estimate v that does not depend on . Regardless of the parameterization in v , under some suitable regularity conditions, and appropriate choices of weighting matrices, the two estimators can be shown to be asymptotically equivalent near 0 in the sense that there exists W V and V W such that for any
where N denotes the sample size.
The estimator in (1) is closely related to ALSE P SD and other Hotz and Miller (1993) 's type estimators that have been widely adopted in the dynamic game setting. In contrast the estimator based on (2) is the asymptotic least squares analog to the estimator proposed in Hotz et al. (1994) .
For the remainder of this section we develop an estimator based on (2) in the context of a dynamic game.
Framework
We consider a game with I players, indexed by i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ig, over an in…nite time horizon. The elements of the game in each period are as follows:
Actions. For notational simplicity we assume all players have the same action space. The action set of each player is A = f0; 1; : : : ; K + 1g. We denote the action variable for player i by a it . Let a t = (a 1t ; : : : ; a It ) 2 A = I i=1 A. We will also occasionally abuse the notation and write a t = (a it ; a it ) where a it = (a 1t ; : : : ; a i 1t ; a i+1t : : : ; a It ) 2 AnA.
States. Player i's information set is represented by the state variables s it 2 S, where s it = (x it ; " it ) such that x it 2 X is common knowledge to all players and " it 2 E = R K+1 denotes private information only observed by player i. Note that common state space X is without any loss of generality. We shall use s it and (x t ; " it ) interchangeably. We de…ne (s t ; s it ; " t ; " it ; E) analogously to (a t ; a it ; A), and denote the support of s t by S = X E.
State Transition. Future states are uncertain. Players'actions and states today a¤ect future states. The evolution of the states is summarize by a Markov transition law P (s t+1 js t ; a t ).
Per Period Payoff Functions. Each player has a payo¤ function, u i : A S ! R, which is time separable. The payo¤ function for player i can depend generally on (a t ; x t ; " it ) but not directly
Discounting Factor. Future period's payo¤s are discounted at the rate i 2 (0; 1) for each player. For notational simplicity we take i = for all i.
We impose the following assumptions throughout the paper.
for all i; i ; a i ; a i ; x; " i , where i; i is known up to i 2 i R p i .
Assumption M2 (Conditional independence). The transitional distribution of the states has the following factorization: P (x t+1 ; " t+1 jx t ; " t ; a t ) = Q (" t+1 ) G (x t+1 jx t ; a t ), where Q is the cumulative distribution function of " t and G denotes the transition law of x t+1 conditioning on a t and x t .
Assumption M3 (Independent private values). The private information is independently distributed across players, and each is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure whose density is bounded on At time t every player observes s it , each then chooses a it simultaneously. We consider a Markovian framework where players'behaviors are stationary across time and players are assumed to play pure strategies. More speci…cally, for some i : S ! A, a it = i (s it ) for all i; t, so that whenever s it = s i then i (s it ) = i (s i ) for any . The beliefs are also time invariant. Player i 0 s beliefs, i , is a distribution of a t = ( 1 (s 1t ) ; : : : ; I (s It )) conditional on x t for some pure Markov strategy pro…le ( 1 ; : : : ; I ). The decision problem for each player is to solve
where
for any s i . The subscript i on the expectation operator makes explicit that present and future actions are integrated out with respect to the beliefs i ; in particular, player i forms an expectation for all players'future actions including herself, and todays actions of opposing players. W i; i ( ; i ) is a policy value function since the expected discounted return needs not be an optimal value from an optimization problem since i can be any beliefs, not necessarily equilibrium beliefs. Note that the transition laws for future states are completely determined by the primitives and the beliefs. Any strategy pro…le that solves the decision problems for all i and is consistent with the beliefs satis…es is an equilibrium strategy. It is well-known that players'best responses are pure strategies almost surely and Markov perfect equilibria for games under M1 -M4 (e.g. see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). However, there may be multiple equilibria.
Pseudo-Model
We now de…ne the pseudo-model that plays a central role in two-step estimation methods. The starting point is the structural assumption that we observe random sample of f 1 (s 1t ) ; : : : ; I (s It ) ; x t ; x t+1 g from a single equilibrium, where
for all a i ; x. Then we have: (i) the equilibrium beliefs for all players is summarized by
for all a; x; x 0 . For notational simplicity, for this section and the next, we shall: omit ; let i and P i denote the equilibrium strategy and choice probability function for player i; and, without any ambiguity let a it = i (s it ) for all i; t. Then the pseudo-model can be de…ned as a collection of joint conditional distributions indexed by = ( > 1 ; : : : ;
Definition: The pseudo-model is fP g 2 such that P = Q I i=1 P i; i and for all i; i ; a i ; x:
; where
By construction P i; i = P i for all i when i = i0 for all i, and V i; i also equals
a it = a then we can write
which is familiar from the classical random utility model (e.g. see McFadden (1974)) with mean utility v i; i . The numerical advantage in working with the pseudo-model, as opposed to the actual model, is that v i; i is relatively straightforward to compute for di¤erent i , since all expectations that de…ne v i; i are calculated independent of i ; all with respect to P (s t+1 js t ; a t ) for all players that is equivalent to earlier notation using E i when i = Q I j=1 P j for all i. We shall heavily exploit the fact that v i; i is a linear transformation of i; i . To see this, …rst look at the choice-speci…c expected return:
. Then, using a linear functional notation, we have
where L and H i are linear maps and r i; i is a linear transformation of i; i . Since (I L)
1 is also generally a well-de…ned linear map, as L is a contraction as its norm is strictly less than 1, then
where R i and R are conditional expectation operators, conditioning on x t , integrating over a it and a t respectively , and
The choice probabilities can also be written in terms of di¤erences in choice speci…c expected
Since A and X are …nite, the relationship between f v i; i (a i ; x)g a i >0;x2X and f i; i (a; x)g a2A;x2X
can be represented through a matrix equation. We state this representation as a lemma.
;x2X can then be represented by a JK vector,
where i; i is a J (K + 1) I vector of f i; i (a; x)g a2A;x2X so that elements in: In what follows, we let v i denote v i; i0 . And, similarly, it shall be convenient to vectorize the probabilities. In particular, we let P i; i and P i denote the JK vector that represent fP i; i (a i jx)g a i >0;x2X and fP i (a i jx)g a i >0;x2X respectively.
Estimation
Many objective functions proposed in the literature often can be written directly in terms of the probabilities from the pseudo-model, such as pseudo-likelihood and GMM, based on the construction that P i; i coincides with P i when i = i0 . However, from a numerical perspective, computing the pseudo-probabilities requires a costly additional step of computation, namely the integration with respect to the distribution of " it that maps v i; i into P i; i (see (5) 
Using Lemma R, we can write v i; i = X i ( i ) + v i , where
Note that i enters X i ( i ) through a matrix transform of the vector i; i , where the former does not depend on i and the latter is completely known and speci…ed by the researcher. By Hotz and
Miller's inversion, we also have v i = i (P i ) for some nonlinear, but known, function i that only depends on the distributional assumption of " it . Then we can de…ne a JK vector, Y i , where
Note that Y i is de…ned independently of i . So that, by construction:
Let Y = Y : : : ; X I ( I )).
In the next section we analyze the asymptotic properties for a class of estimators that are motivated from minimizing
over , for some weighting matrix W.
It is also worth emphasizing that, through
, for any : X ( ) and Y are explicit functions, say T X ( ; 0 ) and T Y ( 0 ) respectively, of a …nite-dimensional vector, 0 , that consists of choice and transition probabilities. However, optimization with S ( ; W) is infeasible since X ( ) and Y are not observed, as 0 is unknown. Given a sample from a single equilibrium, f 1 (s 1t ) ; : : : ; I (s It ) ; x t ; x t+1 g, 0 can be identi…ed from the data under weak conditions, hence X ( ) and Y can also be estimated directly from the data for all . Consequently we consider a feasible estimation criterion where X and Y are replaced by b
for some preliminary estimator, b , of 0 . We denote the sample counterpart of S by b S, so that
where c W can be random and depend on the sample size. We de…ne our estimator, b ( c W), to be the
is generally a nonlinear least square estimator with generated regressors and regressands. Note that b S( ; c W) is easy to evaluate for di¤erent values of , following (7) and (8),
can be computed by a matrix multiplication of i; i by the estimator of D (R i + H i MR), which does not depend on i , and b Y i is also independent of i .
Main Results
We give large sample properties of our estimator in full generality in Section 3.1. We consider special cases when payo¤s have linear-in-parameter and partially linear speci…cations in Section 3.2 and 3.3
respectively. We discuss the relationship between our estimator and ALSE P SD in Section 3. 4 . In what follows we denote the matrix norm by k k, so that kBk = p trace (B > B) for any real matrix B, and we let " p !"and " d !"denote convergence in probability and distribution respectively.
General Case
From the previous section, we see that T X ( ; ) and T Y ( ) are deterministic and smooth functions
in for any . To analyze the asymptotic properties of b ( c W), it will be useful to keep separate the sampling distribution of the preliminary estimator and the corresponding generated regressors and regressands. We begin with a preliminary requirement for b .
There are several choices for b in practice that satisfy P under very weak conditions. The simplest 
) for some non-stochastic positive de…nite matrix .
Comments on Assumptions A1 -A3.
These conditions are su¢ cient for the consistency of our estimator. A1 -A2 constitute to a high level identi…cation condition as it ensures (9) 
Comments on Assumptions A4 -A6.
For the distribution theory, additional local conditions around 0 are required. A4 -A5 are standard smoothness and regularity conditions for an asymptotic normality of an extremum estimator that optimizes a smooth objective function. Similar to the discussion of su¢ cient conditions for A3, using Lemma R, a su¢ cient condition for continuous di¤erentiability of X ( ) in A4 is continuous di¤erentiability of i; i at i0 for all i, then A5 will also follow if P(i) holds. Furthermore, if P(ii)
Our estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal under these assumptions.
In large sample, the estimators that uniquely solve (10) 
The …rst part of Theorem 3 says that the lower variance bound for the class of estimators we consider is r > X 1 r X 1 . The second part states that any consistent estimator of 1 is su¢ cient to produce an e¢ cient estimator. In practice, consistent estimator for 1 will typically require a preliminary consistent estimator for 0 . The simplest choice is to choose W to be an identity matrix,
In this case the estimator for i0 can be computed individually for each player. We state this in the following corollary.
Corollary A (Identity Weighted Estimator): Under assumptions A1, A3 -A6,
. Furthermore, for all i:
Linear-in-Parameter Speci…cation
We now consider the leading special case when payo¤ functions have a linear-in-parameter speci…ca-tion.
Assumption M5 (Linear-in-parameter payo¤s). For all (i; i ; a i ; a i ; x),
for some p dimensional vector i (a i ; a i ; x) = ( We assume M1 -M5 hold throughout this subsection. Then, with a slight abuse of notation, (7) simpli…es to X i i , where
and i is a J (K + 1) I by p matrix of f i (a i ; a i ; x)g a i 2A;x2X . Let X = diag (X 1 ; : : : ; X I ). The limiting and sample objective functions de…ned in (9) and (10) respectively become
is globally convex. The solution to the minization problem has a well-known closed-form expression of a weighted least squares estimator, namely
Although the large sample properties for b lip ( c W) follow immediately from Section 3.1, they can be specialized substantially to incorporate M5. Since the results in this subsection may be most relevant for empirical applications we provide some details here.
Assumption B1: X has full column rank. 
lip for some non-stochastic positive de…nite matrix lip .
Comments on Assumptions B1 -B4.
Similar to A1 -A2, B1 and B2 ensure S lip ( ; W) has a unique solution at 0 . In this case, the full rank condition of X is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the identi…cation of the pseudo-model (for more details see Srisuma (2013) 
Corollary 3 (Efficiency): Under assumptions B1 -B4, (i) the asymptotic variance of
is bounded below by
Similarly to the general case, consistent estimator for lip 1 requires a preliminary consistent estimator for 0 . We have the counterpart to Corollary A when we choose W to be an identity matrix I. , where b
Furthermore, for all i: b 
We have shown here that once we have ( b Y; b X ), under some regularity conditions, a consistent estimator for 0 can be obtained by an OLS estimator, b
which can be used to construct an e¢ cient estimator using a familiar a feasible GLS formulation, 
Partially Linear Speci…cation
One may argue that, in some situations, Assumption M5 is at odds with the spirit of structural We assume M1 -M4 and M6 hold throughout this subsection. Then it is easy to see that the RHS of equation (6) in Lemma R becomes
and, we de…ne, analogously to (7) and (11),
Once again, stacking up the vectors from all players, the limiting and sample objective functions de…ned in (9) and (10) respectively become
where the terms in the above display should by now be familiar. In order to avoid repetition we only provide a brief discussion of how can be (e¢ ciently) estimated.
The structural identifying condition in this setting is: 
A> W is an oblique projection matrix (e.g. see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)), so that M WA X A is a matrix of zeros, and
An asymptotic least squares estimator that minimizes b S pl ( ; c W) can then be constructed sequentially in two stages. Let
In the …rst stage we obtain b
For the second stage, let is the same, and is identical to the one described in Theorem 3.
An Equivalent ALSE
Generally it is not possible to directly compare asymptotic e¢ ciency of di¤erent estimators in the literature, although they estimate the same model, since many of the estimators are de…ned using non-nesting objective functions. An exception can be found in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2007) as special cases. Similar to our general estimator de…ned in Section 2, the class of ALSE P SD is also indexed by a positive de…nite matrix and optimal weights can be found to de…ne an e¢ cient estimator (cf. Theorem 3). As implied by the Proposition E below, our e¢ cient estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the e¢ cient ALSE P SD . In fact, more is true, the class of estimators we consider and that of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler are asymptotically equivalent in the sense that one can choose appropriate weighting matrices so that the two estimators always have the same asymptotic distribution.
Proposition E. ALSE P SD and our estimator are asymptotically equivalent.
The equivalence follows from the existence of a smooth bijective relation between the choice probabilities and the normalized expected payo¤s, i.e. essentially by Hotz and Miller's inversion and an application of the inverse function theorem. The precise relationship between the two estimators are summarized by the equations in display (17) that can be found in the Appendix.
We end this section with a remark on the relationship between asymptotic least squares estimators and GMM estimators. ALSE P SD and our estimator are de…ned using objective functions that look at the di¤erences between the data and pseudo-model implied probabilities and payo¤s respectively at every possible actions and observed states. These di¤erences can also be written as moment conditions, thus asymptotic least squares estimators can also equivalently be de…ned as GMM estimators (see Chamberlain (1987) ). As a consequence, it follows from Proposition E that the GMM estimators of Hotz and Miller (1993) and Hotz et al. (1994) are also asymptotically equivalent for a stationary single agent decision model (a special case of our game when I = 1). 6 
Monte Carlo Experiments
We illustrate the performance of our closed-form estimator using the Monte Carlo design in Sec- 
Setup
Consider a symmetric two-…rm dynamic entry game. In each period t, each …rm i(= 1; 2) has two possible choices: be active or not active, a it 2 f0; 1g, where 0 corresponds to "not active" and 1 to "active" . Publically observed state variable has four elements, and can be represented by the actions made by both …rms in period t 1, so that x t = (a 1t 1 ; a 2t 1 ). The vector of states evolves over time according to the transition s t+1 = a t . Firm 1 0 s period payo¤s are described as follows:
where ( 1 ; 2 ; F; W ) denote respectively the monopoly pro…t, duopoly pro…t, entry cost and scrap value that …rm 1 may obtain. Each …rm also receives additive private shocks that are i.i. d. N (0; 1) .
The game is symmetric and …rm's 2 payo¤s are de…ned analogously.
We set ( show that there are three distinct equilibria (…ve if we permute the identity of the players as there is one symmetric equilibrium). We generate the data using di¤erent equilibria of the game and provide estimates for ( 10 ; 20 ; F 0 ) for each equilibrium. W 0 is taken as known, since it is not separately identi…ed (see Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2013) ). For each sample size T = 100; 500; 1000; 5000, we report the same statistics as Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (mean and standard deviation of the estimator for each parameter, and the averaged mean squared error across the three parameters)
from 1000 simulations of four estimators: OLS, GLS, PSD-I and PSD-E, for each equilibrium. OLS and GLS estimators correspond to our ine¢ cient and e¢ cient estimators that have closed-form (see Corollary B and Corollary 3 respectively). PSD-I and PSD-E are the ine¢ cient and e¢ cient versions of ALSE P SD respectively; the former uses identity weighting matrix. Our Tables 1 -3 below correspond respectively to equilibria 1 -3 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), thus are directly comparable to their Tables 1 -3 The results are as expected from the theory. At smaller sample sizes the estimators are genuinely di¤erent regardless of the choice of weight matrices. Since the model is fully parametric both e¢ cient estimators generally perform better than the ine¢ cient ones even at T = 100 across all equilibria.
With larger sample sizes the ine¢ cient and e¢ cient estimators seem to have similar properties for both methods. Although, in theory, the ine¢ cient estimators need not be asymptotically equivalent as both are weighed by the same identity matrix (see equation (17) in the Appendix).
We now abstract away from the statistical properties and consider the numerical aspects. To illustrate the potential for computational advantages of our estimator, we introduce an additive market …xed e¤ect to the per period payo¤ in the game described above. We use the number of markets, denoted by M, to control the complexity of the game. 7 For each M, we solve the model once and simulated …ve times using the symmetric equilibrium. We report in Table 4 , the average central processing unit (CPU) times in seconds to compute our estimators and ALSE P SD that minimize their respective limiting objective functions (no sampling error, using true choice and transition probabilities); standard errors are in parentheses. Our estimators are substantially faster to compute, and the distinction grows exponentially with more parameters in the model. The reported CPU times also include the construction of the optimal 7 There are other ways to vary the complexity of the game, e.g. by changing the number of potential actions and states. However, the di¢ culty to solve and estimate such games increases signi…cantly as the games become more complexed. Our design is chosen for its simplicity as it only requires us to solve a simple game multiple times. 8 The simulation was performed using MATLAB (R2012a, 64 bit version) on a standard PC running on an Intel
Core (TM) 2 Duo 3.16 GHz processor with 4 GB RAM.
weighting matrices, using numerical derivatives, for GLS and PSD-E. The procedure to compute the optimal weighting matrices are similar for both (asymptotic least squares) estimators, so its contribution in this setting can be approximated by comparing the CPU times of OLS and GLS as M varies. Our results are model speci…c and we precaution against extrapolations as di¤erent designs, as well as algorithms and softwares, will have di¤erent convergence properties for ALSE P SD .
Although a claim that closed-form estimation is generally a much simpler task is quite innocuous.
We also expect the computation time for ALSE P SD to grow at a faster rate with larger action and/or state spaces for any …xed M. Indeed another, perhaps even more important, numerical property of our closed-form estimators is they are always global minimizers. In contrast, a numerical solution to a general nonlinear optimization routine can be sensitive to the search algorithm, initial values, and as well as the nature of the objective function. The computation advantages we describe in this paper accumulates beyond the procedure to obtain a point estimate. For instance, resampling methods that are often used in practice to obtain standard errors (or perhaps to improve …nite sample properties) clearly would bene…t. The type of objective functions we propose also naturally complements other research in the literature that aims to improve the performance and/or scope of two-step methodologies. Two traditional criticisms of two-step estimators are large …nite sample bias (from the …rst stage nonparametric estimation of choice probabilities), and the inability to accommodate unobserved heterogeneity and state variables that are persistent over time. For the former, Mira (2002,2007) propose an iteration scheme that can improve the …nite sample properties by imposing some structure for the …rst stage estimators; see Shimotsu (2008,2012) 
Appendix Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Under A1 to A3, S ( ; W) has a well-separated minimum at 0 . Let
Under A4, it follows that sup 2 k ( )k < 1 and
. Then through some tedious algebra, of repeatedly adding nulls and using properties of the matrix norm:
where the smaller order terms are uniform over under A2 -A3. Therefore sup 2 b S ; c W S ( ; W) = o p (1), and consistency follows from a standard argument (e.g. see Newey and McFadden (1994) ).
Proof of Theorem 2. Under our assumptions, b ( c W) satis…es the …rst order condition from di¤erentiating (10) with respect to with probability tending to 1, i.e.
holds with probability tending to 1. Since Y X ( 0 ) = 0, by adding nulls, we have
, and the second equality follows from A5 after applying mean value expansions to the terms in E 1 and E 2 around 0 . By adding nulls and using properties of matrix norm, since b ( c
with probability tending to 1. Then it follows that
An application of Slutsky's theorem gives the result.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof for part (i) is standard (e.g. see Theorem 3.2 of Hansen (1982)). We claim the optimal weighting matrix converges in the limit to
, it follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that we did not use any speci…c information on c W beyond the fact that it has a positive de…nite probability limit.
Representation Lemma
Proof of Lemma R. First we introduce some additional notations that build on the terms de…ned in Section 2. 
Asymptotic Equivalence of ALSEs
Proof of Proposition E. In the proof of this proposition we shall assume standard regularity conditions hold throughout (i.e. we assume inverse of matrices exist, expected payo¤s and functions are bounded and continuously di¤erentiable etc.). As seen from the proof of Theorem 2, under standard regularity conditions b ( c W) satis…es
Next we introduce ALSE P SD . It shall be useful to bear in mind the illustrative discussion in Section 2.1. We …rst de…ne some additional notations that build on the terms de…ned in Section 2.3.
Let P = P Thus P and P are also deterministic functions of the preliminary estimators (that we denoted by 0 ). We denote the estimators of P and P by e P and b P respectively, and these estimators are constructed based on the same b that de…ne b X and b Y. Note that, although P = P 0 , e P and b P 0 are generally di¤erent. An ALSE P SD , denoted by b P SD ( b V), is de…ned as the minimizer of
for some b V that converges in probability to positive de…nite matrix V (cf. equation (21) . An ALSE P SD satis…es 0 = r > P V e P P b
As the problem is smooth, it can be shown generally that the condition above simpli…es further to 0 = r > P V e P P b P 0 P 0 + P b P SD (V) P 0 + o p 1 p N :
So that we have
By chain rule r P equals r r X , where r denotes the Jacobian of evaluated at v, and
equals r X . Thus, we can write
where the last equality follows from linearizing e P P ( b P 0 P 0 ) in terms of b Y b X ( 0 ). By de…ning W V = r > Vr , we have
Therefore, by comparing (15) and (16), b P SD (V) has the same asymptotic distribution as b (W V ).
In particular, let V denote the e¢ cient weighting matrix for ALSE P SD so that V V for any positive de…nite matrix V. Therefore the e¢ cient ALSE P SD , denoted by b P SD , has the same asymptotic distribution as b (W V ) with W V = r > V r . Then it must hold, by Theorem 3(i), that 1 V since 1 is the lower variance bound. To complete the proof, an identical argument can be made in the reverse direction. It is easy to show that any b (W) that satis…es (15) also has the same asymptotic distribution as b P SD (V W ), where V W = r > 1 Wr 1 (cf. W V ), and r 1 denotes the Jacobian of 1 evaluated at P (that equals (r ) 1 by the inverse function theorem). We omit further details to avoid repetition. Thus, it follows that V 1 , hence we can also conclude that V = 1 . In summary:
and (V; W) can be replaced by any consistent estimators ( b V; c W). Therefore our estimator and ALSE P SD can always be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution and achieve the same lower variance bound.
